Coalition Formation Based Staffing Strategy Development
Mayuko Miyata and Shao-Chin Sung
Aoyama Gakuin University, 5-10-1 Fuchinobe, Chuo-ku, Kanagawa 252-5258, Japan
In this paper, we propose game theoretical models for developing staffing strategies, i.e., strategies which support managers’ decision making on hiring, head hunting, staff reassignment, and implementation of staff development policy in enterprises. Our staffing models are hedonic coalition formation games with newly proposed stability concepts called invitation based stabilities, in which players’ activities of changing their coalitions are motivated based on invitation from other coalitions. These stabilities capture behaviors of managers, employees, and contractors depending on the balance of power in business situations. We analyze the existence of stable coalition structures under invitation based stabilities, and provide several sufficient conditions with natural interpretations as staffing strategies.
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