Coalition Formation Based Staffing Strategy Development

Mayuko Miyata; Shao-Chin Sung

doi:10.20965/jaciii.2012.p0430

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JACIII Vol.16 No.3 pp. 430-435

doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2012.p0430

(2012)

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Coalition Formation Based Staffing Strategy Development

Mayuko Miyata and Shao-Chin Sung

Aoyama Gakuin University, 5-10-1 Fuchinobe, Chuo-ku, Kanagawa 252-5258, Japan

Received:

October 15, 2011

Accepted:

December 31, 2011

Published:

May 20, 2012

Keywords:

hedonic game, coalition formation, staffing strategy, staffing decisions

Abstract

In this paper, we propose game theoretical models for developing staffing strategies, i.e., strategies which support managers’ decision making on hiring, head hunting, staff reassignment, and implementation of staff development policy in enterprises. Our staffing models are hedonic coalition formation games with newly proposed stability concepts called invitation based stabilities, in which players’ activities of changing their coalitions are motivated based on invitation from other coalitions. These stabilities capture behaviors of managers, employees, and contractors depending on the balance of power in business situations. We analyze the existence of stable coalition structures under invitation based stabilities, and provide several sufficient conditions with natural interpretations as staffing strategies.

Cite this article as:

M. Miyata and S. Sung, “Coalition Formation Based Staffing Strategy Development,” J. Adv. Comput. Intell. Intell. Inform., Vol.16 No.3, pp. 430-435, 2012.

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References

[1] J. Drèze and J. Greenberg, “Hedonic coalitions: optimality and stability,” Econometrica, Vol.48, pp. 987-1003, 1980.
[2] S. Sung and D. Dimitrov, “On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games,” Theory and Decision, Vol.62, pp. 31-45, 2006.
[3] C. Ballester, “NP-completeness in hedonic games,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.49, pp. 1-30, 2004.
[4] A. Bogomolnaia and M. Jackson, “The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.38, pp. 213-214, 2002.
[5] D. Dimitrov, P. Borm, R. Hendrickx, and S. Sung, “Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games,” Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.26, pp. 421-433, 2006.

This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationa License.

[1] [1] J. Drèze and J. Greenberg, “Hedonic coalitions: optimality and stability,” Econometrica, Vol.48, pp. 987-1003, 1980.

[2] [2] S. Sung and D. Dimitrov, “On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games,” Theory and Decision, Vol.62, pp. 31-45, 2006.

[3] [3] C. Ballester, “NP-completeness in hedonic games,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.49, pp. 1-30, 2004.

[4] [4] A. Bogomolnaia and M. Jackson, “The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.38, pp. 213-214, 2002.

[5] [5] D. Dimitrov, P. Borm, R. Hendrickx, and S. Sung, “Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games,” Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.26, pp. 421-433, 2006.