As online resources such as social media are increasingly used in disaster situations, confusion caused by the spread of false information, misinformation, and hoaxes has become an issue. Although a large amount of research has been conducted on how to suppress disinformation, i.e., the widespread dissemination of such false information, most of the research from a revenue perspective has been based on prisoner’s dilemma experiments, and there has been no analysis of measures to deal with the actual occurrence of disinformation on disaster SNSs. In this paper, we focus on the fact that one of the characteristics of disaster SNS information is that it allows citizens to confirm the reality of a disaster. Hereafter, we refer to this as collective debunking, and we propose a profit-agent model for it and conduct an analysis using an evolutionary game. As a result, we experimentally found that deception in the confirmation of disaster information uploaded to SNS is likely to lead to the occurrence of disinformation. We also found that if this deception can be detected and punished, for example by patrols, it tends to suppress the occurrence of disinformation.

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