Experimental Analysis of the Attribution of Own Actions  to the Intention of Self or Others by the Multiple Forward Models

Mihoko Otake; Kohei Arai; Motoichiro Kato; Takaki Maeda; Yusuke Ikemoto; Kuniaki Kawabata; Toshihisa Takagi; Hajime Asama

doi:10.20965/jrm.2007.p0482

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JRM Vol.19 No.4 pp. 482-488

doi: 10.20965/jrm.2007.p0482

(2007)

Paper:

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Experimental Analysis of the Attribution of Own Actions to the Intention of Self or Others by the Multiple Forward Models

Mihoko Otake^, Kohei Arai^, Motoichiro Kato^, Takaki Maeda^, Yusuke Ikemoto^*, Kuniaki Kawabata^***, Toshihisa Takagi^,
and Hajime Asama^

^*Research into Artifacts, Center for Engineering, the University of Tokyo, 5-1-5 Kashiwa-no-ha, Kashiwa-shi 277-8568, Japan

^**Department of Neuropsychiatry, School of Medicine, Keio University, 35 Shinanomachi, Shinjuku-ku 160-0016, Japan

^***Distributed Adaptive Robotics Research Unit, RIKEN, 2-1 Hirosawa, Wako 351-0198, Japan

Received:

January 15, 2007

Accepted:

June 28, 2007

Published:

August 20, 2007

Keywords:

forward model, schizophrenia, attribution of own actions, simulations, experimental analysis

Abstract

Human cognitive mechanisms have been studied for designing user-friendly interface. One of the key issues is the attribution of own actions to the intention of self or others. It is known that patients with schizophrenia who sometimes attribute their own actions to the intentions of others may perceive themselves as causing events which they do not in fact control, when they feel they are in voluntary movement. In this study, we administered similar experiments to normal subjects. We also conducted computational simulations through extending the multiple forward models, which successfully described the experimental results.

Cite this article as:

M. Otake, K. Arai, M. Kato, T. Maeda, Y. Ikemoto, K. Kawabata, T. Takagi, and H. Asama, “Experimental Analysis of the Attribution of Own Actions to the Intention of Self or Others by the Multiple Forward Models,” J. Robot. Mechatron., Vol.19 No.4, pp. 482-488, 2007.

Data files:

References

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This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationa License.

[1] [1] S. J. Blakemore, D. A. Oakley, and C. D. Frith, “Delusions of alien control in the normal brain,” Neuropsychologia, Vol.41, pp. 1058-1067, 2003.

[2] [2] E. Dapratia, N. Francka, N. Georgieffa, J. Proustc, E. Pacheriec, J. Daleryd, and M. Jeanneroda, “Looking for the agent: an investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients,” Cognition, Vol.65, pp. 71-86, 1997.

[3] [3] C. Farrer, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, C. D. Frith, J. Decety, and M. Jeannerod, “Modulating the experience of agency: a positron emission tomography study,” Neuroimage, Vol.18, pp. 324-333, 2003.

[4] [4] C. Farrer and C. D. Frith, “Experiencing oneself vs another person as being the cause of an action : the neural correlates of the experience of agency,” Neuroimage, Vol.15, pp. 596-603, 2002.

[5] [5] N. Frank, C. Farrer, N. Georgieff, M. Marie-Cardine, J. Dalery, T. d. Amato, and M. Jeannerod, “Defective recognition of one’s own actions in patients with schizophrenia,” American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol.158, pp. 454-459, 2001.

[6] [6] M. Jeannerod and N. Georgieff, “Consciousness of external reality: a “who” system for consciousness of action and selfconsciousness,” Consciousness and Cognition, pp. 465-477, 1998.

[7] [7] D. M. Wolpert, K. Doya, and M. Kawato, “A unifying computational framework for motor control and social interaction,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, Vol.358, pp. 593-602, 2003.

[8] [8] D. M. Wolpert and M. Kawato, “Multiple paired forward and inverse models for motor control,” Neural Networks, Vol.11, pp. 1317-1329, 1998.

Experimental Analysis of the Attribution of Own Actions to the Intention of Self or Others by the Multiple Forward Models

Mihoko Otake*, Kohei Arai*, Motoichiro Kato**, Takaki Maeda**, Yusuke Ikemoto*, Kuniaki Kawabata***, Toshihisa Takagi*, and Hajime Asama*

Mihoko Otake^, Kohei Arai^, Motoichiro Kato^, Takaki Maeda^, Yusuke Ikemoto^*, Kuniaki Kawabata^***, Toshihisa Takagi^,
and Hajime Asama^