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JACIII Vol.18 No.4 pp. 624-631
doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2014.p0624
(2014)

Paper:

Analysis of a Public Good Game Permitted New Entries: a Role of Defectors to Maintain Cooperation

Hitoshi Yamamoto*, Isamu Okada**, and Yuki Ogawa***

*Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, 3-2-16 Osaki, Shinagawa-ku, Tokyo 141-8602, Japan

**Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, 1-236 Tangi, Hachioji City, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan

***Faculty of Geo-Environmental Science, Rissho University, 1700 Magechi, Kumagaya-shi, Saitama 360-0194, Japan

Received:
July 21, 2013
Accepted:
March 10, 2014
Published:
July 20, 2014
Keywords:
public goods game, evolution of cooperation, agent-based simulation, a social vaccine
Abstract

We studied a public good game, in which metanorms work, permitted new entries. Although whoever wants to entry the game, either cooperators or noncooperators, can try to participate in the game, a manager of the game can control a policy to permit who are ok. By changing the level of control, we investigated what type of policies is effective to maintain cooperation. Especially, we compared a strict policy of population management that only cooperative participants are permitted to entry it, and a simple policy of population management that non-cooperative participants are permitted. According to our simulation of the model, it is revealed surprisingly that a level of cooperation of the game collapses when a strict policy was adopted. On the other hand, cooperation level maintains high robustly if a tolerant policy that some invaders who are perfect defectors are permitted. We conclude that an existence of a few amount of defection has an effect on cooperation of the society. We call this effect a social vaccine effect.

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Last updated on Sep. 20, 2017