This paper presents the results of a questionnaire survey conducted on those who had difficulty commuting after the 2018 Osaka earthquake. As with the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, serious traffic congestion occurred in downtown Osaka following the 2018 disaster. Based on the questionnaire survey on those who had difficulty commuting, which is considered to be a factor of traffic congestion, it was found that 60–70% commuted as usual after the earthquake; about half of the commuters who usually take the train changed their method of commuting, one-quarter of whom used automobiles; there were very few who experienced problems in their work because they had not gone to work or their workplace had closed down for the day; and many felt that it would be better to receive instructions on work attendance in the aftermath of an earthquake. The present study points out the need for companies and society to adopt rules so that those who find it difficult to commute will refrain from going to work and remain in their local communities to help others, except for those in certain occupations or positions.

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