JDR Vol.6 No.5 pp. 482-485
doi: 10.20965/jdr.2011.p0482


The Macondo Oil Field Disaster

Michael C. Lynch

Strategic Energy & Economic Research, Inc., Box 7, Amherst, MA 01002, USA

April 26, 2011
August 19, 2011
October 1, 2011
Macondo, oil spill, BP
TheMacondo oil rig explosion and subsequent oil spill was the worst disaster in the US offshore oil industry since 1969. Although some worried that it reflected the greater challenges of deepwater drilling for which the industry was not prepared, investigations have shown that a variety of decisions made, primarily during the drilling of the well, caused the blowout and explosion. Apparently, a corporate culture of cost cutting led to many of these decisions, and it suggests that human failures, both in senior levels where culture is set, and at the lower levels where it affects operations, are the primary challenges that need to be overcome to reduce the likelihood of future disaster.
Cite this article as:
M. Lynch, “The Macondo Oil Field Disaster,” J. Disaster Res., Vol.6 No.5, pp. 482-485, 2011.
Data files:
  1. [1] Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunzel, “Stumbling into Bad Behavior,” NYT 4/21/11, A21.
  2. [2] “BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” Incident Preparedness Spill Review, US Coast Guard, March 2011.
  3. [3] K. C. Clarke and Jeffrey J. Hemphill, “The Santa Barbara Oil Spill: A Retrospective.” Yearbook of the Association of Pacific Coast Geographers, 2002.
  4. [4] Russell Gold and Angel Gonzalez, “BP Suits Blame Contractor Negligence,” WSJ 4/21/11.
  5. [5] “Macondo: The Gulf Oil Disaster,” Chief Counsel’s Report, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Deepwater Drilling, 2011.
  6. [6] Peter Senge, “The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization,” 1990, Century Books.

*This site is desgined based on HTML5 and CSS3 for modern browsers, e.g. Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, Opera.

Last updated on May. 28, 2024