JACIII Vol.17 No.1 pp. 94-102
doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2013.p0094

Position Paper:

A Mechanism Design for Managing Emissions in Energy Supply Sector

Ken Nagasaka*, Hiroshi Takamori**, and Eiroku Go***

*Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology, 2-24-16 Nakamachi, Koganei-shi, Tokyo 184-8588, Japan

**Waseda University Environmental Research Center, 2-7-10 Misaki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0061, Japan

***CSD Corporation, 3-2-1 Sakato, Takatsu-ku, Kawasaki-shi, Kanagawa, Japan

December 10, 2012
December 21, 2012
January 20, 2013
auction mechanism, emissions demand schedule, power utilities, pricing of allowances, asymmetry of information

The strategic design for a program for managing the commons involves devising a scheme where those regulated are not trapped into inefficient equilibrium of moral hazardous behavior. This paper studies the auctionmechanism for allocating allowance or licenses for CO2 emission and also pricing transferable allowance. For the sake of clear presentation, we use a behavioral model of an electricity supplier firm to define key ingredients in the auction mechanism. Program implementation is evaluated by simulating the firm’s response to various levels of constraint under the program.

Cite this article as:
K. Nagasaka, H. Takamori, and E. Go, “A Mechanism Design for Managing Emissions in Energy Supply Sector,” J. Adv. Comput. Intell. Intell. Inform., Vol.17, No.1, pp. 94-102, 2013.
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Last updated on Jul. 04, 2020