This paper aims to identify the root causes that exacerbated the economic damage from the 2011 Chao Phraya river flood disaster in central Thailand industrial complex area. Finding root causes is crucial for learning from disasters; however, there has not been much investigation of the economic damage root causes with regard to the 2011 Chao Phraya river flood disaster. This paper seeks to investigate the root causes of the economic damage by organizing the existing analytical frameworks, tools and approaches to clarify why industrial parks and estates experienced such substantial economic devastation that resonated worldwide. The study’s research design includes a social background survey, in-depth interview surveys and an investigation of the disaster’s root causes. Through the research, inadequate urban and land use planning facilitated by a decentralization policy, foreign companies settlement in the country, which involved urbanization and relocation without proper risk assessment, information, and knowledge, and supplier’s responsibility based on the supply chain’s structure, are detected as root causes for the high economic damage in the industrial complex area. This study also provides key lessons essential to building regional resilience in industrial complex areas: 1) considering the potential risks of regional planning, which include both socio-economic and climate changes; 2) clarifying the roles of companies, regions, and nations in sharing risk information with related stakeholders before, during, and after a disaster; and 3) building horizontal and vertical collaborations among all related stakeholders.

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