JDR Vol.16 No.6 pp. 933-935
doi: 10.20965/jdr.2021.p0933


Structure of Rumor Disaster – On Fukushima Daiichi N.P.P. Unit 4 –

Katsuki Takiguchi

Tokyo Institute of Technology
Yokohama, Kanagawa, Japan

Corresponding author

April 2, 2021
July 28, 2021
September 15, 2021
rumor, Fukushima Daiichi N.P.P. Unit 4, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Ooi N.P.P. Units 3 and 4, court

The misleading information spreads into the society, the people move on the basis of it. This mechanism, what I call “rumor disaster” is examined in this note. Authorities, specialists, intellectuals, and so on, oftentimes, might take part in this process. In this note, the spent fuel storage pool of Tokyo Electric Power Fukushima Daiichi N.P.P. Unit 4 is the case used for discussion because there are relatively abundant materials and the resulting impact to the society is very big.

Cite this article as:
Katsuki Takiguchi, “Structure of Rumor Disaster – On Fukushima Daiichi N.P.P. Unit 4 –,” J. Disaster Res., Vol.16, No.6, pp. 933-935, 2021.
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Last updated on Sep. 19, 2021