JACIII Vol.22 No.4 pp. 429-436
doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2018.p0429


Institutional Investors Holding, Market-Maker System, and Stock Liquidity: An Empirical Study Based on the NEEQ Market

Yang Wang

School of Economics and Management, Anhui Normal University
No. 189 Jiuhua South Road, Wuhu, Anhui 241002, China

July 21, 2017
December 23, 2017
July 20, 2018
institutional investors holding, market-maker system, stock liquidity, NEEQ market

This paper demonstrates the influence of institutional investors shareholding on stock liquidity by means of samples from the NEEQ market from 2014 to 2016. The results of this study suggest that, first, institutional investors shareholding will reduce the liquidity of stocks under agreement trading, and the higher the proportion of shareholding, the worse will become the liquidity. Second, shareholding by institutional investors significantly increases the liquidity of stocks under market-making trade. Third, owing to the function of class market making, the influence of private ownership on liquidity is more positive than that of other kinds of institutional shareholding.

Cite this article as:
Y. Wang, “Institutional Investors Holding, Market-Maker System, and Stock Liquidity: An Empirical Study Based on the NEEQ Market,” J. Adv. Comput. Intell. Intell. Inform., Vol.22 No.4, pp. 429-436, 2018.
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Last updated on May. 19, 2024