JACIII Vol.22 No.1 pp. 27-33
doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2018.p0027


On Inheritance of Complementarity in Non-Additive Measures Under Bounded Interactions

Katsushige Fujimoto

College of Symbiotic Systems Science, Fukushima University
1 Kanayagawa, Fukushima 960-1293, Japan

November 20, 2016
April 28, 2017
January 20, 2018
non-additive measure, complementarity, k-monotonicity, restricted domain, bounded interaction

The notions of k-monotonicity and superadditivity for non-additive measures (e.g., capacity and cooperative games) are used as indices to measure the complementarity of criteria/coalitions in decision-making involving multiple criteria and/or cooperative game theory. To avoid exponential complexity in capacity-based multicriteria decision-making models, k-additive capacities and/or 𝒞-decomposable capacities are often adopted. While, in cooperative game theory, under communication-restricted situations, some coalitions cannot generally be formed. This paper investigates the inheritance of complementary relationships/effects in non-additive measures with restricted domains (or under bounded interactions).

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Last updated on Feb. 21, 2018