JACIII Vol.21 No.6 pp. 1034-1039
doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2017.p1034


Production Competition in Electricity Sector: Social Welfare vs. Managerial Incentives in a Partially Regulated Duopoly

Vitaliy Kalashnikov*1,†, Daniel Flores Curiel*1, and Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov*2,*3,*4

*1Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León (UANL)
Av. Lázaro Cárdenas 4600 Ote., Fracc. Residencial Las Torres Monterrey, Nuevo León, C.P. 64930, Mexico

*2Tecnológico de Monterrey (ITESM), Mexico

*3Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (CEMI), Moscow, Russia

*4Sumy State University (SumDU), Sumy, Ukraine

Corresponding author

December 20, 2016
May 2, 2017
October 20, 2017
mixed duopoly, profit maximization, social welfare.

We study production competition between two electricity producers, where one of them is subject to a nationalization decision and the other is a private producer that chooses managerial incentives to counter governmental actions. The government wants to maximize a modified form of social welfare and chooses partial nationalization, which still has a serious impact on the rival private producer. We find, that by offering managerial incentives the private producer recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization. We also find that such equilibrium might produce the same level of social welfare than one without incentives.

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Last updated on Dec. 12, 2017