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JACIII Vol.15 No.4 pp. 438-448
doi: 10.20965/jaciii.2011.p0438
(2011)

Paper:

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Trustees’ and Investors’ Behavior in the First Two Rounds of a Trust Game: Overview and a (Partial) Explanation Based on Cooperative Game Theory

Misha Koshelev*,**

*Human Neuroimaging Lab, Division of Neuroscience, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX 77030, USA

**W. M. Keck Center for Interdisciplinary Bioscience Training, Houston, TX 77030, USA

Received:
January 7, 2011
Accepted:
February 14, 2011
Published:
June 20, 2011
Creative Commons License
Keywords:
social behavior, trust game, cooperative game theory, decision theory
Abstract
To study social behavior, researchers studied simple games like the multi-round trust game. Based on experimental data, several models have been proposed to explain how players behave in the third and following rounds depending on their previous behavior in this game. However, none of these models explain the behavior in the first rounds. In this paper, we show that cooperative game theory can lead to a partial explanation of the trustees’ (and investors’) behavior in the first rounds.
Cite this article as:
M. Koshelev, “Trustees’ and Investors’ Behavior in the First Two Rounds of a Trust Game: Overview and a (Partial) Explanation Based on Cooperative Game Theory,” J. Adv. Comput. Intell. Intell. Inform., Vol.15 No.4, pp. 438-448, 2011.
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