Compared to other countries, Thailand has fewer seismic hazards. Hazardous experiences greatly influence the expertise and abilities of actors that implement and execute public disaster responses. In domestic disaster situations, there are protocols and resources that facilitate a national disaster response. However, in overseas responses, disaster response becomes more challenging as more responsibilities with limited authorities and resources are required. In this research, the public disaster response of the Royal Thai Embassy in Tokyo was explored and evaluated on the basis of several disaster scenarios. This research was developed to understand the state of disaster response, enhance the effectiveness of disaster response protocols, and reduce unnecessary resource consumption. This study intended to fulfill organizational needs and responsibilities. The study converts existing protocol that is written in document form into a time series disaster response plan for disaster drills based on a possible worst-case scenario, i.e., the Kumamoto Earthquake scenario in 2016 and the Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011. The plan was used in a disaster drill to evaluate organizational responses. The results from drills and discussions and comments from participant information flow primarily manage communications, cooperation, and connections, which are dependent on experiences and expertise in disaster management. This further affects information flow management and assistance capabilities. The outputs and outcomes from this research can be used as a guideline for application to other embassies in Japan, the Royal Thai Embassy in other countries, and general overseas organizations. This work may apply to other public disaster responses aside from natural disasters.

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