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JDR Vol.10 No.1 pp. 151-162
(2015)
doi: 10.20965/jdr.2015.p0151

Paper:

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Analysis of the Banks’ Initial Reactions with the 9/11 and 3/11

Yasutake Sayanagi and Kenji Watanabe

Nagoya Institute of Technology, Gokiso-cho, Showa-ku, Nagoya, Aichi 466-8555, Japan

Received:
April 1, 2014
Accepted:
October 27, 2014
Published:
February 1, 2015
Creative Commons License
Keywords:
bank, finance, BCM, BCP, disaster
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the initial reactions of banks with the disaster to improve the resiliency of banking industry and encourage banks to share more disaster related information in the industry to help each other. Two severe cases in the banking industry were picked up, one for the 3/11 Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 (3/11 or 311) and the other for the 9/11 terrorist attack of 2001 (9/11 or 911). In addition, to support identifying the issues of the banks, this study refers to the case of Otsuchi Town Hall that had serious damages by the 3/11 Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, as it is difficult making a direct comparison with some points between Iwate Banks and Fuji Bank. Those are analyzed in comparison with the other case of the Otsuchi Town Hall. Those cases are discussed from the various angles such as the immediate tasks they have to perform when disaster happens (the Day Zero Duty), the recovery location strategy, BCMPolicy and Crisis leaders. Potential conflicts were found between the BCM policy and the Day Zero Duty as well as the quick decision making and having too many recovery options etc.
Cite this article as:
Y. Sayanagi and K. Watanabe, “Analysis of the Banks’ Initial Reactions with the 9/11 and 3/11,” J. Disaster Res., Vol.10 No.1, pp. 151-162, 2015.
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